Tiebout A Pure Theory Of Local Expenditures Pdf Download
bd40bc7c7a In my view, this argument relies on a set of assumptions that are unrealistically strict (see the 7 assumptions listed on page 419). As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it. Tiebout points out the these analyses implicitly assumed that only central governments provide public goods. Musgrave and Samuelson studies whether public goods provision could ever be optimal. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
I think that moving costs are so high that we shouldn't expect Tiebout's argument to work very well at all. Corrections When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:64:y:1956:p:416. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. A response to earlier works by [separately] Samuelson and Musgrave. Citations Blog mentions As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research: Feet vs. One route is for the municipalities to act as a cartel, enforcing a singular tax rate among the various communities. Given that individuals have differing personal valuations on these services and varying ability to pay the attendant taxes, individuals will move from one local community to another which maximizes their personal utility. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.